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When a seller gives a buyer a right of ﬁrst refusal, although it reduces the competing
buyers’ proﬁts and creates an ineﬃciency, it always increases the joint proﬁt of the seller
and the right holder. Right of ﬁrst refusal with a consideration (e.g., a payment from
the right holder to the seller) allows the seller and the right holder to extract more
surplus from the competing buyers.
JEL codes: D44, K12, K22
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Suppose in the midst of a lease negotiations between a property-owner and a prospective
tenant, the tenant asks for a right of ﬁrst refusal on the owner’s property for the lease term.
If the owner agrees to the tenant’s proposal, whenever a third party makes an oﬀer to
buy the owner’s property and the owner decides to sell, before accepting the third party’s
oﬀer, the owner must ﬁrst give the tenant the opportunity to match the third party’s
oﬀer and purchase the property. On its ﬁrst impression, the right confers the tenant a
leverage in acquiring the owner’s property by being able to observe the third party’s oﬀer
without revealing his own value for the property. At the same time, it puts the owner at
a disadvantage by not being to induce a more competitive bidding between the tenant and
the third party,1 and robs the third party an opportunity to compete more on an equal
footing against the tenant.
Regardless of this seeming bias, the usage of right of ﬁrst refusal is wide-spread: it
is visible not only in lease transactions, but also in joint ventures, corporate securities, oil
and gas transactions, employment, broadcasting agreements and contracts involving various
commercial products.2 The most frequently oﬀered justiﬁcation seems to be that the right
minimizes the undesirable possibility of the right holder’s facing a new, hostile partner in the
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1relationship. When the value from the relationship is sensitive to the identify of the partner,
the right allows the right holder to preempt the possibility of an incompatible partner (and
a lower value from the relationship) by buying out the entire property. For instance, in
the close corporation context, some argue that adopting a right of ﬁrst refusal provides the
shareholders the leverage in being able to choose the future partners in the transaction and
thereby preserve the value of the ﬁrm.3 In accordance, the courts have upheld its legality
as being a “reasonable” restriction on the transferability of the encumbered property.4
However, the assumption that the value of the relationship is sensitive to the identity of
the partner also implies that the right holder is likely to place a higher value on the property
than the third party. In the landlord-tenant setting, because the tenant’s value of the lease
is lower when the property is sold to an inhospitable third party, holding everything else
constant, the tenant would be willing to pay more for the property than the third party.
Even if a competitive sale process takes place, the tenant is more likely to acquire the
property anyway, so that granting the right to the tenant seems to over-protect the tenant,
while possibly reducing the owner’s return from the sale. Furthermore, the right is often
used in transactions, such as oil and gas and commercial products, where the identity-
sensitivity is absent or, at best, minimal. The traditional justiﬁcation seems to lack power
in explaining the wide-spread use of the right when preserving the identity of the business
partner is either unnecessary or unimportant.
We attempt to provide a more systematic analysis of the right of ﬁrst refusal. By casting
the right as an auction process, we can explicitly analyze the behaviors of the tenant, the
owner, and the third party, and answer questions such as whether the involved parties will
indeed be better or worse oﬀ with the right, and what incentive the owner and the tenant
will have in inserting this clause in their contract. In a private value setting with two
bidders (B1 and B2) and one seller (S), we treat the right of ﬁrst refusal as granting one of
the bidders (B1) the right to observe the other’s (B2’s) bid before making his own. When
B1 has the right, B2 ﬁrst makes an oﬀer, and B1 c a ne i t h e rm a t c hB2’s oﬀer or let B2 win
the auction after observing B2’s oﬀer. We compare the results from the right of ﬁrst refusal
to those from the four “standard” auctions: ﬁrst-price-sealed-bid, second-price-sealed-bid,
English, and Dutch auctions.
Allowing B1 to make such a conditional oﬀer reduces B2’s expected proﬁts and produces
an ineﬃciency. Because B2 bids below his value (b2 <v 2), B1 can win the auction even
when his value is lower than B2’s (b2 <v 1 <v 2), hence reducing B2’s chances of winning
and allocating the property to the bidder with a lower value. On the other hand, the right
has an ambiguous eﬀect on B1’s and the seller’s stand-alone proﬁts. When the buyers’
values are positively correlated, B1’s proﬁti sh i g h e ri nt h eﬁr s tp r i c ea u c t i o nt h a ni nt h e
English auction. In the English auction, the winning bidder’s payment is equal to the
losing bidder’s value, so if B1 wins, B1’s payment is equal to v2. In contrast, when B1
has the right of ﬁrst refusal, since he would never pay more than b2, B1’s winning bid is
less than v2, hence yielding a higher proﬁt. When B2 becomes very aggressive (b2 → v2),
2however, B1’s proﬁt may only be slightly higher than in the English auction, but insuﬃcient
to surpass the proﬁt from the ﬁrst price auction. For the seller, B2 becoming aggressive
raises the seller’s proﬁt to the point that, in the extreme, the seller may be able to extract
close to the entire surplus of B2, whereas this is never possible in the standard auctions.
Most importantly, the expected joint proﬁt of the seller and the right-holder (S and B1)
will always be higher with the right than in the standard auctions. Suppose the seller’s
value of the property is zero, and the seller can choose between the English auction and
the right of ﬁrst refusal. In the English auction, since the winning bidder’s payment is
equal to the losing bidder’s value, regardless of who wins the auction, the joint proﬁto ft h e
seller and the right-holder (S and B1) is equal to the right-holder’s value (v1). With the
right, however, B2 can win the auction only when his bid is above the right-holder’s value
(b2 >v 1), since otherwise, B1 will match the bid and obtain the property. So, while B1’s
winning produces the joint proﬁt that is equal to the right-holder’s value (v1), B2’s winning
produces the proﬁtt h a ti ss t r i c t l yh i g h e rt h a nB1’s value (b2 >v 1), thus, yielding a higher
joint proﬁt for the seller and the right-holder.
The higher joint proﬁt provides an incentive for the seller to “sell” the right to B1 for an
adequate consideration. In the landlord-tenant setting, for instance, if the right does reduce
the owner’s expected return from her future sale, as a contractual consideration, the owner
can demand a higher lease payment. Similarly, in a joint venture setting, the partners can
exchange rights of ﬁrst refusal on their ownership shares as considerations. While giving
the right to the other partner reduces the third party’s expected proﬁt from bidding for the
partner’s share in the future, it provides a positive beneﬁt for both partners. In a sense, the
right of ﬁrst refusal functions as an explicit, court-endorsed collusion mechanism between
the buyer and the seller against future buyers.5 It extracts rent from future buyers with
relatively high values, while prohibiting lower-valued buyers from purchasing the property:
it functions as a contractual barrier to entry.6
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an illustrative example
with a uniform distribution with independent values that is suﬃciently rich to explain the
main ideas but with minimal analytics. In the following section, we demonstrate the result
with a more general distribution. We compare the right of ﬁrst refusal case to the four
standard auctions and explain why the right-holder’s and the seller’s stand-alone proﬁts
c a nb ee i t h e rh i g h e ro rl o w e rw i t ht h er i g h tb u tw h yt h ej o i n tp r o ﬁto ft h es e l l e ra n dt h e
right-holder is always higher. The last section concludes with thoughts for future research.
2 An Illustrative Example
Suppose we have two buyers (B1 and B2)a n das e l l e r( S) ,w h oa r ea l lr i s kn e u t r a l . T h e
seller has the reservation value of zero (vs =0 ), while the buyers’ values (v1 and v2)a r e
independently and uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. The seller can run either a
3ﬁrst-price-sealed-bid auction, or grant a right of ﬁrst refusal to the ﬁrst buyer (B1). If B1
has the right, B1 makes a bid (br
1) only after observing B2’s bid (br
2). In the real world,
conditional on the seller deciding to sell the property, the right obligates the seller to reveal
a third party’s oﬀer (br
2) to the right holder and given the right holder the option to match
the third party’s bid. So, our setting is analytically similar. In contrast, in the ﬁrst-price-





third party oﬀer does not obligate the seller to reveal that oﬀer to the inside buyer, so the
inside buyer (B1) must compete against the third party (B2) without knowing the nature
of the third party’s oﬀer (br
2).
2.1 First Price Sealed Bid Auction




2 , and given the symmetry, a buyer will win only when he values
the property more than the competitor (vi >v j). Conditional on a buyer’s value (vi),
his expected proﬁt is the probability that the competing buyer’s value is less than his,
p(vj <v i), multiplied by his proﬁt margin, vi − b
f
i = vi
2 . In the current example, this
probability is equal to vi, so that his conditional expected proﬁti s
v2
i
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2. The expected social welfare, given by the sum










42.2 Right of First Refusal
Let’s ﬁrst solve for the buyers’ optimal bidding strategies: br
i(vi).S i n c e B1 observes br
2
before making his own bid, B1 will match br
2 if br
2 is less than v1, and drop out (or bid zero)
if br


















B2 will choose br














4 . Note that B2 adopts the same strategy as in the ﬁrst price
auction. Therefore, while his proﬁt margin is the same as in the ﬁrst price auction (v2
2 ),
the probability of winning is lower (from v2 to v2



















Compared to the ﬁrst price auction, B2’s expected proﬁti sl o w e rb y 1
12.
For B1, we need to examine two separate cases. First, given br
2 = v2
2 , B2’s highest bid
is 1
2. So, whenever v1 > 1
2, B1 will obtain the good with certainty while expecting to pay
br
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Second, when v1 < 1
2, B1’s conditional proﬁti se q u a lt oprob(br
2 <v 1) multiplied by his
expected proﬁt margin, which is v1 minus B2’s expected bid conditional on B2’s bid being
less than v1, i.e., (v1 − E(br
2|br




































5Compared to the ﬁrst price auction, B1’s expected proﬁti sh i g h e rb y1
8.
The seller’s expected proﬁt can be derived by adding both buyers’ expected payments.
B2’s expected payment is
E(B0
























































Compared to the ﬁrst price auction, the seller’s proﬁti sl o w e rb y 1









The right of ﬁrst refusal generates a welfare loss of 1
24. However, the expected joint proﬁt





24, which is higher than in the ﬁrst price
auction by 1
24.
2.3 The Joint Proﬁt of the First Buyer and the Seller
The reason the right of ﬁrst refusal increases the joint proﬁts t e m sf r o mt h ef a c tt h a tw h e n
B1 has the right, B2 must bid above B1’s value (br
2 >v 1) to win the competition, whereas,




1) to win. Regardless
of the auction type, we know that B1’s winning produces the joint proﬁtt h a ti se q u a lt o
v1, so the source of diﬀerence in the joint proﬁtl i e si nh o wm u c hB2 pays when B2 wins the
auction. In the ﬁrst price auction, B2 is able to obtain the property whenever B2 values
t h ep r o p e r t ym o r et h a nB1, and, when he wins, he only has to pay v1.O n c e B1 is allowed
to observe B2’s bid through the right of ﬁrst refusal, however, because B2 has to pay more
than v1 to win, B2’s winning produces a proﬁto fbr
2 which is higher than v1. Although
6the probability that B2 will win is lower than in the ﬁrst price auction, so long as that
probability is positive, the right produces a higher expected joint proﬁt for the seller and
the right holder.
To better illustrate, suppose v2 is ﬁxed at 1
2 and v1 is distributed uniformly between 0






2 ,a ss h o w na b o v e . S o ,





2), and when B1 wins, the joint proﬁto fB1 and




s =( v1− v1
2 )+(v1−0) = v1). When B2 wins, which happens
when v1 < 1






4 − 0) = 1
4).
But, this is equal to B1’s expected value conditional on losing, i.e., E(v1|v1 < 1
2). Therefore,
regardless of the identity of the winner, the expected joint proﬁto fB1 and the seller is equal
to v1.
Now, suppose B1 has the right of ﬁrst refusal. While B2 bids 1
4 as before, because B1
gets to observe B2’s bid, B1 wins whenever v1 ≥ 1
4.W h i l e B1’s probability of winning
is higher, when B1 wins, the joint proﬁt of the seller and the ﬁrst buyer is still equal
to v1 (πr
1 + πr
s =( v1 − 1
4)+( 1
4 − 0) = v1). The diﬀerence kicks in when B1 loses.
When v1 < 1





4 −0) = 1
4). In contrast to the ﬁrst price auction, this joint proﬁti sh i g h e r
than B1’s expected value for the good (E(v1|v1 < 1
4)=1
8) by the virtue of the fact that
B2 has to outbid B1’s value. Hence, even when B1 loses, B1 and the seller realize a joint
proﬁt that is higher than B1’s value. The right “forces” B2 to outbid B1’s value to win
and enables the seller and B1 to extract more surplus from B2, while generating a welfare
loss in the process.
In this example with uniform, independent distributions, the seller’s stand-alone proﬁt
always decreases with the right while the right-holder’s proﬁt always increases. Although
this may seem intuitive, we show that this won’t always be the case. First, since the buy-
ers are competing for the same good, it is quite plausible that their values are positively
correlated: independence no longer holds. In that case, the buyers’ and the seller’s proﬁts
are sensitive to which type of standard auction is selected, and this may, in turn, produce
diﬀerent relative proﬁt ranking when compared to the right of ﬁrst refusal. Second, what
is unique about the uniform distribution is that the second buyer’s strategy is independent
o fw h e t h e ro rn o tt h eﬁrst buyer has the right of ﬁrst refusal. Under other types of distri-
butions, the second buyer can become more or less aggressive (compared to the standard
auctions), and this will also produce diﬀerent proﬁts for both the seller and the right holder.
Since neither the uniformity nor the independence assumptions are realistic, we relax them
in the next section and produce the more general results.
73T h e M o d e l
There are three risk-neutral, proﬁt-maximizing players with a single good. A seller (S)h a s
the good with the reservation value of zero. An inside buyer (B1), whose value of the good
is v1, can be given the right of ﬁrst refusal. An outside bidder (B2) competes against the
inside buyer and values the good at v2. We assume that v1 and v2 are unknown, ex ante, but
have a joint distribution over the support of [0,v]2 with a strictly positive, diﬀerentiable
density of f(v1,v 2).7 We assume that f(v1,v 2) satisﬁes the monotone likelihood ratio
property (MLRP), i.e., ∂2
∂v1∂v2 ln(f(v1,v 2)) ≥ 0.8 The assumption implies that if one buyer
values the good highly, the other buyer is also likely to value the good highly.9 It allows
the possibility of commonality in the values of the property. If the condition is satisﬁed
with equality, the values are independent.
The timing of the game is as follows. We assume that there is no time discount.
First, the seller decides whether to grant a right of ﬁrst refusal to the ﬁrst buyer (B1)a n d
announces her decision to the buyers. We assume that if the seller grants the right to the
ﬁrst buyer, B1 pays the seller as a consideration,10 and if the seller does not grant the right,
the seller chooses one of four standard auctions: English, Dutch, ﬁrst-price-sealed-bid, or
second-price-sealed-bid. Second, the buyers privately and costlessly observe their values.11
Third, the selected auction is run and the property is sold to the highest bidder. If the ﬁrst
buyer (B1) has the right of ﬁrst refusal, the second buyer (B2) ﬁrst makes a bid, and the
ﬁrst buyer makes a competing bid, after observing the second buyer’s bid. If, for instance,
the ﬁrst-price-sealed-bid auction is run, both buyers simultaneously submit their bids.
3.1 Standard Auctions
In the standard auctions, the bidder with a higher value wins the auction. In either the
English or the second price auctions, it is each player’s dominant strategy to either stay in
the auction until the ascending price reaches to the bidder’s value or bid his own value, so
that the winning bidder’s payment is equal to the losing bidder’s value. In the ﬁrst price
or the Dutch auctions, the winning bidder’s payment is equal to the price the bidder stops
the descending price at or the bid the bidder makes. Since the bidding behavior will be
sensitive to the beliefs the bidder has about the other’s behavior, we assume symmetry in
bidding strategies and ﬁnd the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium. The derivations are
s h o w ni nt h ea p p e n d i x .
The expected proﬁts of all three players will be equal in the English and the second price
auctions, and in the ﬁrst price and the Dutch auctions. Denote the players’ expected proﬁts
in the English and the second price auctions as E(πe
i) and their proﬁts in the ﬁrst price
and the Dutch auctions as E(π
f
i ) where i ∈ {1,2,s}. As well known in the literature, the
monotone likelihood ratio property of the density function implies that the seller’s expected
proﬁt will be (weakly) higher in the English or the second price auctions than in the ﬁrst
8price or the Dutch auctions (E(πe
s) ≥ E(π
f
s)). Conversely, the buyers’ expected proﬁts in




i ) for i ∈ {1,2}). If we examine the joint expected proﬁto ft h e
seller and the ﬁrst buyer (B1), we obtain the following result.
Lemma 1 In the standard auctions, the expected joint proﬁto ft h eﬁrst buyer and the seller







Consider the English or the second price auction. If the ﬁrst buyer wins, the joint
proﬁti se q u a lt ov1 (πe
1 + πe
s = v1 − b1 + b1 − 0). Even when the second buyer wins, since
the second buyer only pays v1, the joint proﬁt is, again, equal to v1 (πe
1 + πe
s = v1 − 0).
H e n c e ,t h ee xa n t ej o i n tp r o ﬁt is equal to the unconditional expected value of the ﬁrst buyer.
Similarly, in the ﬁrst price or the Dutch auctions, the ﬁrst buyer’s winning produces the




s = v1 −b1+b1 −0). However, when the second buyer wins,
the monotone likelihood ratio property implies that the second buyer’s payment is (weakly)
less than the ﬁrst buyer’s value (b
f
2 ≤ v1), so that the joint proﬁto ft h eﬁrst buyer and the




s ≤ v1). Therefore, the expected joint proﬁt will be less than
the unconditional expected value of the ﬁrst buyer.
Since the seller, at best, receives the lower of the buyers’ values as the winning bid, both
buyers earn positive proﬁts, and the seller cannot extract the full surplus from the either







(v2 − v1)f(v1,v 2)dv2dv1
Since the ﬁrst buyer’s payment equals v2 when the ﬁrst buyer wins, the joint proﬁto f
the seller and the second buyer is also equal to the second buyer’s unconditional expected
valuation, E(v2), which is given by the ﬁrst expression. The second expression denotes
the expected proﬁt (informational rent) that accrues to the second buyer: the expected
diﬀerence between the winning bid (v1)a n dv2.
3.2 Right of First Refusal
When the ﬁrst buyer has the right of ﬁrst refusal, the second buyer loses whenever his bid
is less than the ﬁrst buyer’s value. If we let br
i(vi) to indicate buyer i’s bidding strategy,









9For the second buyer, because the ﬁrst buyer’s optimal strategy depends on the second
buyer’s bid (as opposed to his value), closed-form solution, as in the standard auctions,
cannot be found. Instead, the optimal strategy is implicitly deﬁned.








Due to the highly asymmetric bidding strategies between the buyers, we cannot guar-
antee that the second buyer’s optimal bid will necessarily increase as his value increases.
We leave open the possibility that br
2(v2) might actually be decreasing over some range.
Furthermore, without making functional assumptions about the distribution, we cannot a
priori determine how aggressive the second buyer will become when the ﬁrst buyer has the




2(v2)). What is important for our results is that the second buyer’s
optimal bid is less than his value for the good (br
2(v2) ≤ v2). This is evident from the
lemma since the density is strictly positive (f1(br
2(v2)|v2) > 0).
When the ﬁrst buyer has the right of ﬁrst refusal, the second buyer’s expected proﬁt
will be strictly lower compared to the standard auctions. The right reduces both his
chances of winning and the margin of proﬁt. In the standard auctions, the second buyer
won whenever his value is higher than the ﬁrst buyer’s (v2 ≥ v1) and the second buyer’s
(expected) payment was equal or less than the ﬁrst buyer’s value (bs
2 ≤ v1). In contrast,
when the ﬁrst buyer has the right, the second buyer can win when his bid is higher than
the ﬁrst buyer’s value. Since his bid is lower than his value, this allows the ﬁrst buyer to
w i nt h ea u c t i o ne v e nw h e nt h eﬁrst buyer’s value is lower than the second buyer’s: B2’s
probability of winning is lower. Also, because the second buyer’s winning bid is higher
than the ﬁrst buyer’s value (br
2 ≥ v1), his proﬁt margin is smaller compared to the standard
auctions (br
2 ≥ v1 ≥ bs
2).
For the ﬁrst buyer, compared to the English or the second price auctions, he earns
a bigger proﬁt. In the English or the second price auctions, the ﬁrst buyer pays the
second buyer’s value when he wins the auction (be
1 = v2). With the right, because the
ﬁrst buyer only matches the second buyer’s bid and the second buyer bids below his value
(br
1 = br
2(v2) ≤ v2), the ﬁrst buyer’s expected payment is lower and his proﬁt is higher.
However, when the right is compared to the ﬁrst price or the Dutch auctions, since the ﬁrst
buyer’s (expected) pay is already lower than the second buyer’s value (b
f
1 ≤ v2), the proﬁt
ranking becomes ambiguous. If, for instance, the second buyer becomes very aggressive
(br
2(v2) → v2) when the ﬁrst buyer has the right, the ﬁrst buyer’s proﬁt will only be slightly
higher than in the English or the second price auctions, insuﬃcient to outrank that in the
ﬁrst price or the Dutch auctions.
10Proposition 1 When the ﬁrst buyer has a right of ﬁrst refusal, the second buyer’s expected






While the ﬁrst buyer is better oﬀ compared to the English or the second price auctions, he






To better understand the signiﬁcance of the second buyer’s strategy on the ﬁrst buyer’s
expected proﬁt, suppose, for the moment, that B2 irrationally adopts the strategy of
br
2(v2)=v2. Then, B1 wins only when v1 >v 2 = br
2, and when he wins, he pays B2’s
value conditional on B2’s value being less than v1. Therefore,












This is equal to the ﬁrst buyer’s proﬁt when the English or the second price auctions is
adopted. Since the ﬁrst buyer’s proﬁti sh i g h e rw i t ht h eﬁrst price or the Dutch auctions,
B2 being very aggressive can imply that the ﬁrst buyer’s proﬁt is lower with the right than
in the ﬁrst price or the Dutch auctions.





The seller can be either better or worse oﬀ than in the standard auctions:
E(πr
s) Q E(πk
s) where k ∈ {e,f}
Consider again the case where the second buyer is maximally aggressive: br
2(v2)=v2.
Since the ﬁrst buyer never pays more than the second buyer’s bid, the seller earns the second
buyer’s expected value of the good: E(πr
s)=E(v2). But, this is higher than the seller’s
proﬁt in the four standard auctions, where her proﬁt is always less than the expected value
of the second buyer due to the second buyer’s earning some information rent. Hence, the
right of ﬁrst refusal can increase the seller’s proﬁt. Conversely, if the second buyer becomes
less, or even equally, aggressive (br
2(v2) → 0) compared to the standard auctions, the seller’s
proﬁt will be lower. This was the case in the example with the uniform, independent values.







(v2 − v1)f(v1,v 2)dv1dv2
The right creates cases where the ﬁrst buyer’s value is lower than the second buyer’s, but
the good is allocated to the ﬁrst buyer. This happens when br
2(v2) <v 1 <v 2,a n dt h el o s s
of welfare in that case is equal to v2 −v1. Despite the lower social welfare, the joint proﬁt
of the ﬁrst buyer and the seller will always be higher than in the standard auctions.
Proposition 3 The joint proﬁto ft h eﬁrst buyer and the seller is higher when the seller






1) where k ∈ {e,f}
Figure 1 graphically summarizes the impact of the right of ﬁrst refusal. To analyze the
right’s eﬀect on the joint proﬁto ft h eﬁrst buyer and the seller, consider three diﬀerent cases.
First, when the ﬁrst buyer wins with a value higher than the second buyer’s (v1 ≥ v2), which
corresponds to the area above the diagonal (v1 = v2), the ﬁrst buyer and the seller realize
the same joint proﬁt as in the standard auctions: πr
1 + πr
s = v1. Second, when the ﬁrst
buyer wins but has a lower value than the second buyer, area below the diagonal but above
br
2(v2), the right produces the joint proﬁto fv1, whereas the standard auctions yield the
joint proﬁt that is either equal to (English and second price) or less than (ﬁrst price and
Dutch) v1. So, the right does at least as well as the standard auctions. Third, when the
second buyer wins, which is below br
2(v2), because the second buyer is bidding more than
v1, the joint proﬁt is strictly higher than v1. Since the standard auctions, at best, produce
the joint proﬁte q u a lt ov1 in this region, the right of ﬁrst refusal does strictly better.
T h ee xa n t ed i ﬀerence in the joint proﬁts can be calculated by summing up the diﬀerences














2(v2) − v1)dF > 0
In the English or the second price auctions, the ﬁrst term will be equal to zero and only the
second term remains, whereas in the ﬁrst price or the Dutch auctions, the ﬁrst term can be
positive. Regardless of the ﬁrst term, since the second term is strictly positive, the right
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Figure 1: Impact of Right of First Refusal

















which is consistent with the result from the previous section.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has made a ﬁrst-cut analysis of the right of ﬁrst refusal by showing how it can
be used by the contracting parties to extract more rent from a non-contracting party. The
right allows one of the bidders to observe the other bidder’s bid, and therefore, to (most
likely) increase both his chances of winning and his expected proﬁt. The paper shows that
compared to a more even-handed competition, while the other bidder is worse oﬀ, the joint
proﬁt of the right-holder and the seller will always be higher. In short, the argument falls
under the larger theme of using a bilateral contract to exert an externality on a third party.
Also consistent with the main arguments in the contractual externality literature, it is shown
that the right, without any countervailing, welfare-producing features, will decrease social
welfare. This is because the right allows the right-holder to win the auction even when his
v a l u eo ft h eg o o di sl o w e rt h a nt h a to ft h ec o m p e t i n gb i d d e r ’ s .
The analysis can be easily extended to the settings of more than two bidders. It will be
tantamount to seller’s choosing only the highest oﬀer (b(1)) among the competing bidders
and presenting that to the right holder to match. This will reduce the extra rent accrued
to the right-holder and the seller and increase welfare, since the probability that the highest
bid is below the right-holder’s value (prob(b(1) ≤ v1)) decreases as the number of bidders
increases. The paper can also easily incorporate a bilateral exchange of rights of ﬁrst refusal.
When two agents have either a joint or a shared ownership of a good, they can reciprocate
the rights of ﬁrst refusal to each other, as done in joint ventures or close corporations. One
advantage of such exchange is that when the probabilities of separation are about equal, no
other consideration may be necessary.
One policy implication from the analysis is that the arrangement should be of suspect
when other, welfare-enhancing motivations are absent, and the courts should adopt a more
stringent standard in its “reasonableness” test. However, it remains yet to be explored
what some of these positive motivations could be. For instance, it could be possible that
the right of ﬁrst refusal can be used to provide a better (relationship-speciﬁc) investment
incentives for the contracting parties, for instance, in joint ventures. Similarly, perhaps the
right can be used to create a lock-in eﬀect to foster better cooperation among the parties.
While it is uncertain whether the right of ﬁrst refusal is the optimal method of solving
14the investment or the cooperation problems, in the next step of the analysis, we intend to
examine whether, or what, welfare-enhancing justiﬁcations exist, and how the courts can
tailor their views toward the arrangement in light of the possible beneﬁts.
15Proofs
The Standard Auctions. In the English auction, the dominant strategy is to stay
in the auction as long as the announced price is less than one’s value. Similarly, in the
second-price-sealed-bid auction, it is each bidder’s dominant strategy to bid his own value.
Hence, the winning bidder pays the losing bidder’s value, and the buyers’ conditional proﬁts















Fj(vi|vi)dvj, which denotes the buyer’s expected payment conditional





















For the ﬁrst price or the Dutch auctions, we can solve for a symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibrium as follows. First, given that the second buyer is using the strategy b(v2),w h i c h
is strictly increasing and diﬀerentiable, the ﬁrst buyer’s expected proﬁti fh eb i d sb1 when
his value is v1 is
π1(b1|v1)=p(b1 >b (v2)|v1)(v1 − b1)=F2(b−1(b1)|v1)(v1 − b1)
The ﬁrst order condition, after imposing symmetry, yields the diﬀerential equation of





























Next, we can show that the buyers’ expected payments in the English or the second price
auctions will be higher than in the Dutch or the ﬁrst price auctions by showing that be(vi) ≥
bf(vi) ∀vi.F i r s t , be(0) = bf(0) = 0.S e c o n d ,
dbf(vi)
dvi
=( vi − bf(vi))
fj(vi|vi)
Fj(vi|vi)
16Third, after some algebra, it can be shown that
dbe(vi)
dvi















T h em o n o t o n el i k e l i h o o dr a t i op r o p e r t yi m p l i e st h a tt h es e c o n dt e r mw i l lb e( w e a k l y )




dvi .S i n c e b o t h be(vi) and bf(vi)



















































P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . Conditional on v2, B2 maximizes
π2(b2|v2)=p(b2 >v 1|v2)(v2 − b2)=F1(b2|v2)(v2 − b2).
The ﬁrst order condition is
dπ2(b2|v2)
db2








17Since f(v1,v 2) > 0 ∀(v1,v 2), f1(br
2(v2)|v2) > 0 ∀v2,s ot h a tbr
2(v2) <v 2 unless v2 =0 .
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the ﬁrst buyer, however, E(πr
1) T E(π
f







1) so that, in the limit, E(πr
1) <E (π
f
1). On the other hand, as
br
2(v2) → 0,t h eﬁrst buyer wins all the time with almost zero bid, so that E(πr
1) → E(v1),
which is strictly higher than E(π
f
1).








































































so that the relative sizes of E(πr
s) and E(πe




























2(v2) → 0, on the other hand, E(πe
s) >E (πr
s).





























































2(v2) − v1)dF > 0
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21Notes
1Walker argues that the right is being used to “inhibit [the seller] from selling in the ﬁrst place.” Walker
(1999) at 6. Similar argument is also made by the highest New York state court in LIN Broadcasting v.
Metromedia Inc., 74 N.Y.2d 54, 62. If this is indeed a case, however, it remains a puzzle as to why the
seller would voluntarily agree to the right.
2See Walker (1999) at 7—14 for an overview of the practice. Johnson and Stanford (1999) has an extensive
treatment of the right used in oil and gas transactions.
3See Bainbridge (2002) at 811. See also Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) at 238—43.
4Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534 (1957), discussing Massachusetts close corporations law.
See also 1A Corbin on Contracts § 261, at 468—82 (1963).
5Others have studied collusive arrangements among bidders. See, e.g., Graham and Marshall (1987) and
McAfee and McMillan (1992).
6This argument was formalized in Aghion and Bolton (1987). Their result was on liquidated damages,
whereas ours is on auction design, but the substance of the argument is similar.
7For the possibility that the right holder’s value may be sensitive to the identify of the winner, we can
introduce an asymmetry by letting v1 ∈ [v1,v1] and v2 ∈ [v2,v2] where 0 ≤ v1 < v2 and v1 > v2.W e c a n
further decompose v1 to be v11 − v12,w h e r ev11 is the right-holder’s value when he wins the auction and
v12 is his value when the rival wins. While these generalizations can produce correlation in values with
asymmetric ranges of support, the main results will remain unaﬀected.
8Milgrom and Weber (1982) calls this relation “aﬃliation” when the density function is not diﬀerentiable.





0 ≥ x and y
0 ≥ y.
9Although the interdependence assumption can allow the seller to extract the entire surplus from the
bidders, as in Cremer and McLean (1988), since such mechanisms impose large, negative proﬁts on the
bidders and seem unrealistic, we focus only on the standard auctions.
10Since the seller is negotiating this right before B1 discovers v1, the negotiation does not involve asym-
metric information. Also, instead of negotiating with B1, the seller can, in theory, put up the right for
auction between the buyers and/or set a reservation price to extract more surplus. However, in reality,
since the identity of B2 is usually unknown until he makes a bid for the property, such mechanisms will be
diﬃcult to implement.
11Allowing for the uncertainty in the buyers’ values, where the buyers observe only the signals (e.g.,
s1 = v1 + ε1) about the values of the property, will not change the main results.
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